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RECENT DECISIONS
ments, 24 Ore. L Rev. 227 (1945); Rottschaefer, Constitutional Law Sec. 227
(1939). An award of a money judgment constituted "State action" in Old Wayne
Mutual Life Association v. McDonough, 204 U. S. 8, 23 (1907). The Supreme
Court will determine for itself whether the act complained of is "State action" for
purposes of the Constitution and will nor be bound by the characterization
resorted to by the State courts. Home Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Los Angeles,
227 U. S. 278 (1913).
Most legal commentators after the Shelley case who speculated as to the
possibility of an action being allowed for damages concluded that this remedy was
also foreclosed. Scanlan, Racial Restrictions in Real Estate-Property Values
Versus Human Values, 24 Notre Dame Law, 155, 182 (1949); Ming, Racial
Restrictions and the Fourteenth Amendment; The Restrictive Covenant Cases,
16 U. Chi. L. Rev. 203, 217 (1948); Crooks, Racial Covenant Cases, 37 Geo. L. J.
514, 525 (1949); Lathrop, The Racial Covenant Cases, 1948 Wis. L. Rev.
508, 527.
The coercive power of the State alone, standing behind racial covenants,
indirectly effectuates the discriminatory purposes of these agreements. A judgment
for damages is simultaneously a State authorized sanction against willing vendors
for their refusal to voluntarily adhere to the terms of the covenant and a deterrant
upon other willing vendors which hinders the right of non-Caucasians to freely
acquire property. A racially discriminatory covenant, as a matter of constitutional
law, should be treated as valid, but unenforceable in any manner by State courts.
Maynard C. Schaus, Jr.
TESTAMENTARY TRUSTS-ACCUMULATIONS-CHOICE OF LAW
Testatrix died in 1940, domiciled in California. By her will she established
a trust for the benefit of her son. The trustees were directed: "To pay one-quarter
of the net income thereof to or for the benefit of (the) son, until he shall have
attained the age of thirty years, and upon his attaining the age of thirty years to
pay one-half of the net income to or for the benefit of (the) said son until he
shall attain the age of forty-five years, and upon his attaining the age of forty-five
years to pay the principal of said trust fund together with accumulated income
thereon to (the) said son." The California court transferred the property to New
York state where the beneficiary resided. The son having attained his majority
demanded that the trustees pay over to him the entire accumulated income of the
trust and annually pay him the future income. The Surrogate directed them to do
so; holding that the provisions for accumulation of income beyond the minority
of the beneficiary, though valid in California, were illegal in New York and that
he was not required to substitute the policy and laws of a foreign state for those
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of New York. In re Clarkson's IFill, - Misc. - , 107 N. Y. S. 2d 289 (Surr.
Ct. 1951).
The validity of statutory provisions barring the accumulation of income by
a trust has long been recognized. See Woodford v. Thelluson, 4 Ves. 227, 31 Eng.
Rep. 117 (1799); 11 Ves. 112, 32 Eng. Rep. 1030 (1805). It has been generally
assumed that the common law of the United States permitted accumulations for
21 years after lives in being. 21 R. C. L. Perpetuities §§82, 83; 48 C. J. Perpetui-
ties §80. On this assumption thirteen states have passed statutes providing for a
shorter period. New York in 1831 limited accumulations of income to the
minority of the cestui que trust. The present provisions, making the same limi-
tation, are incorporated in the Personal Property Law §16 and the Real Property
Law §61.
Calif6 ria in her Civil Code of 1872 followed the minority period limitation
established1by New York. In 1929 the Code provision was amended so as to
allow accumulations for the same length of time that alienation might be suspended,
which is lives in being or in the alternative 25 years in gross. Thus the accurnu-
lation provisions in Mrs. Clarkson's will were valid under the law of her domicile.
Reiss v. Reiss, 45 Cal. App. 2d 740, 114 P. 2d 718 (1941); In re Hardy's Estate,
62 Cal. App. 2d 958, 145 P. 2d 910 (1944).
As a general proposition the validity of a disposition of personal property is
determined by the lex domicilii, and a trust valid by the law of a foreign jurisdic-
tion where a testator was domiciled will not be declared invalid, though illegal
under the rules of the state where it is to be administered. Goodrich, Conflict of
Laws, 517, Third Edition (1949).
The New York courts have faced this problem before and the decisions
consistently follow the general rule. In a case in which the property was located
in New York and the trust was created in New York, the law of New Jersey was
applied in order to effectuate the testator's intent. Shannon v. Irving Trust Co.,
275 N. Y. 95, 9 N. E. 2d 792 (1937). Massachusetts law was applied to a case
where funds were deposited in a New York bank by a resident of Massachusetts
in trust for his nieces in Ireland. Morris v. Sheehan, 121 Misc. 222, 184 N. Y.
Supp. 121 (1920), aff'd. without opinion 199 App. Div. 968, 191 N. Y. Supp.
939 (1921). arfd. 234 N. Y. 366, 138 N. E. 23 (1922). In Cross v. U. S. Trust
Company of New York, 131 N. Y. 330, 30 N. E. 125 (1892), as here, a testator
domiciled in a foreign state (Rhode Island) created a trust valid under the laws
of that "state but invalid by the laws of New York. The validity of the accumula-
tion provisions were determined by the law of the testator's domicile.
Despite the precedents, however, in the instant case the Surrogate applied
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New York law and found the provisions for the accumulation of income by the
trust to be invalid. In arriving at this result he found that the public policy of
this state was established by its laws. For this premise, surprisingly, he cited,
among others, the Cross case, supra, in which it was said at page 341: "It does not
follow that a trust created by the laws of another state is contrary to our public
policy with respect to accumulations ... simply because the law of that state differs
in some respects from ours."
Conceding that the provision for accumulation beyond the minority of the
beneficiary was valid under the laws of California, the Surrogate next found that
he was not bound by comity to substitute the policy and laws of a foreign state for
those of New York. For this premise he cited two decisions of lower courts, one
involving a negligence action, the other an action against a foreign corporation
doing a banking business in this state. Clough v. Gardiner, 111 Misc. 244, 182
N. Y. Supp. 803 (Sup. Cr. 1920); Pennington v. Townsend, 7 Wend. 276 (Sup.
Cr. N. Y. 1831). The Cross decision, supra, at 349 says: "Every right that any
party acquired by the law of domicile ought by comity to be respected here." the
use of this misleading word "comity" has frequently occasioned the misconception
that courts have an unregulated discretion in choosing the law to apply. Judge
Cardozo dealing with the problem in 1918 wrote: "The courts are not free to refuse
to enforce a foreign right at the pleasure of the judges, to suit the individual
notion of expediency or fairness. They do not dose their doors unless help would
violate some fundamental principle of justice, some prevalent conception of good
morals, some deep rooted tradition of the common weal" Loucks v. Standard Oil
Company of N. Y., 224 N. Y. 99, 111, 120 N. E. 198, 202, (1918).
The Surrogate also found that when a person sends property into another
jurisdiction he submits it to the laws of that foreign jurisdiction. It is true that
it is the presence of the property within the state which gives the New York
courts jurisdiction over this type of action. As is illustrated in all of the-prior
cases, however, the New York courts having taken jurisdiction apply the law of
the testators domicile. The Cross case, supra, applied the law of Rhode Island;
the Shannon case, supra applied the law of New Jersey; the Morris case, supra
applied the law of Massachusetts; one Court of Appeals case even applied the law
of Peru. Dammert v. Osborne, 140 N. Y. 30, 35 N. E. 407 (1893).
The decision of the Surrogate in the instant case seems, therefore, to be
erroneous and contrary to precedent in this state.
Robert 1. Blaney
